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The French “État legale” in Vietnam.  
Between Legal Pluralism and Police State 
Detlef Briesen 
The following article examines the effects of the French “État legale” in its 
colonies in Southeast Asia. This question at least implicitly plays an important 
role in the other contributions collected here. Since French law is an integral 
part of the continental-European legal tradition, it is also being studied here 
with the respective categories. Obviously I am not pursuing a Euro-centric 
perspective, but I am primarily interesting in describing one of the starting 
points for the contemporary Vietnamese debate on the rule of law: the abol-
ishment of the Confucian system of law and order by virtue, and its replace-
ment by a rather arbitrary French “État légale” from 1858–1954. Other toe-
holds, which are not discussed in my article, are developments after 1945, 
1954, and 1986 in particular.  
France and the Law in its Colonial Empire 
A constitutional state is a state in which constitutional powers are legally 
bound, which is particularly limited in its actions by law to secure the freedom 
of the individual. Judging from today's prevailing opinion in Germany the 
state of law (rule of law or more accurately “Rechtsstaat”) includes other ele-
ments in addition to the rule of law: 
- legal guarantee of fundamental human rights, 
- legal guarantee of coexistence of the people in the same personal freedom, 
- securing material justice, 
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- ensuring legal certainty (certitudo and securitas), 
- institutional moderation of government activity by the separation of pow-
ers, the prohibition of excess and the principle of proportionality, 
- laws binding all government activity by a primacy of law, 
- salvo of a legal authorization for all incriminating state acts, 
- verifiability of state acts through independent courts, in particular on 
whether government action which engages the rights of an individual, is 
legitimate and appropriate.1 
In French law, there is today, under the influence of the German tradition, a 
similar schema of categories that indicate whether a country is to be regarded 
as a “Rechtsstaat” or not. This has led to the loan translation of the German 
term into “État de droit” in French. Originally, the term “État légale” was 
more common in France. It designated a state in which control had been com-
pletely taken over by a civil society and its expression of political will, the 
parliament. This found its expression in a common understanding that laws are 
the central tool for the control of the state by the parliament. Consequently, 
only by means of laws adopted by parliament was it possible to interfere legit-
imately in society, politics, economy etc. French legal thought focused origi-
nally on the creation and enforcement of laws.2 The rule of law in an extended 
interpretation is in contrast a relatively recent historical achievement. In coun-
tries like France or Germany it was fully established only in the decades after 
World War II. When it comes to the specific character of the French rule in 
Vietnam 1858–1946, so far two factors must always be taken into account. 
First: The enforcement of a fully developed “Rechtsstaat” beyond the mere 
binding of governmental activity to laws was also in France itself a protracted 
process. Much more was required than just the famous Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (“Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du 
Citoyen”), which was announced by the French National Assembly on 26 Au-
gust 1789. During the 100 years of French colonial rule over Vietnam, the 
state of law had severe deficits, was controversial and even endangered in 
France itself. The Second Empire was an authoritarian state, during the Third 
Republic the state of law was seriously threatened by attempts of restoration, 
political justice, martial law, first and foremost during the World Wars, and 
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by another authoritarian government, the State of Vichy. Even the Fourth and 
Fifth Republic were shaken to their foundations by the anti-colonial liberation 
wars in Indochina and Algeria, and the associated substantial violations of 
human and civil rights. 
Second: The fact that the rule of law was a contentious issue in France itself, 
was in addition to the strong anti-democratic forces caused by the dual charac-
ter which the country had from the mid-19th to mid-20th century: France was 
from 1871 until 1940 one of the few democratic republics in Europe, but at 
the same time it possessed a colonial empire. The latter was actually the largest 
in the world but for the British, and provided France with resources to com-
pete with the strongest power of continental Europe until 1945, Germany. To 
keep control over its empire was therefore the fundament of its status as a 
Great Power. This implied another iron necessity: All colonialized people in 
Asia, Africa, America and Oceania could not be provided with the same human 
and civil rights and particularly not with full legal equality and freedom as the 
French from the motherland. 
The limited extend of the rule of law in the colonies therefore had a logic 
that was established on the one hand by the role of France in the system of 
Great Powers and its capabilities to conquer a country like Vietnam so easily. 
On the other hand, there were fiscal reasons. Colonization could cause political 
problems in France, so it had to be at least cost-neutral for the French taxpayer. 
To achieve this, the colonies and protectorates had in turn to be profitable, 
that is, they had to yield profits for France. This restricted certain forms of 
development, especially political participation and a full development of a 
“Rechtsstaat”. The French empire overseas was therefore characterized by legal 
pluralism, and inevitably applied to political and economic oppression and 
exploitation.3 
The Law in Vietnam before Colonization 
To understand the French encroachment on Vietnam, it is essential to have an 
idea about the preceding Empire of Vietnam and its law. Seen from the per-
spective of European constitutional theory, the Empire of Vietnam was a state 
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of law in the limited sense. Its constitutional structure was based on a complex 
network of multiple actors legitimized by written law, customs and rites. It 
consisted of the emperor and his mandarins, the village communities and the 
extended family groups. 
The Emperor and his Mandarins 
The reign of Emperor and his elite, the mandarins, was ritually-morally legit-
imized by a “heavenly mandate”. The objective of the latter was to achieve an 
ideal society which guaranteed peace, order, harmony, social satisfaction and 
material prosperity. While such socio-political objectives are universal in prin-
ciple, the means to achieve to them were of pure Confucian origin: “virtue”, 
“knowledge”, “righteous path”, including the idea of “governing by virtue”.4 
Virtue was also the central category of political theory, and it was nothing but 
an expression of a cosmological moral law called “Tao”. It was the common 
regulator of cosmic and social order and thus extended to the subunits of the 
latter or the entire hierarchy of the cosmos, society, family and individual.  
Law in the Empire of Vietnam had therefore a cosmological source, and in 
daily practice it was mainly a product of moral action. This raised the question 
of how the ruling classes could ensure order in society from their Confucian 
view, namely through harmonious moral action itself, also known as “Li”.5 It 
went far beyond the right ceremonial-ritual behavior and was a collective for-
mula for harmonious action in the sense of equilibrium in all actions. Emper-
ors and mandarins had thus to act as role models in moral action, in the hope 
that a positive impact on the people would arise therefrom. They also had to 
behave in accordance with the three basic social commitments and the five 
cardinal virtues, and were confronted with specific obligations arising from the 
respective social position too. Writers, farmers, artisans and merchants each 
had to follow specific ethical imperatives and to provide full dedication in the 
service of the community.6  
At the top of this ethical-ritual-oriented system of rule of law or virtue was 
the emperor. French observers usually interpreted his role primarily as that of 
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an “idole sacrée“,7 who would formally remain in power in order not to unnec-
essarily provoke the population. However, the French missed a crucial compo-
nent, because the sacral legitimation also implied a political mandate. An em-
peror who failed could be forced by his subjects to resign or even commit sui-
cide. However, since this meant a considerable effort, it was enough, as a rule, 
when an Emperor kept the “imperial attitude” and operated its function as a 
“ritually-sacred object” without mistakes.8 This became increasingly impossi-
ble under the conditions of the colonial state. 
Below the Emperor there was a ruling class in pre-colonial Vietnam, the 
mandarins, whose authority was based on the success in the imperial examina-
tion system and thus acquired Confucian knowledge. Since mandarins lived 
among the illiterate population, the rise of an education contender to a higher 
degree was witnessed by the masses. Extensive ceremonies were also held to 
honor mandarins when reaching a new status.9 Their training not only consist-
ed of technical skills such as reading and writing and a general knowledge 
about Confucian theory, but of acquiring correct thinking as it was understood 
as a precondition for right action when in office.  
The mandarin bureaucracy consisted only of a very limited number of men. 
Figures from the colonial era-until the 1930s when the mandarins remained 
under the protectorate treaties in office in Tonkin and Annam confirm such a 
view: In 1896, a total of 418 mandarins with 858 assistants administered the 
first and second class managed prefectures in Tonkin, not more than one ad-
ministrator per 4,000 to 5,000 residents.10 Mandarins were ordered by a hier-
archy of ranks, of certain positions at the imperial court, which corresponded 
to the respective organizational level of provinces, sub-provinces and cantons.11 
Mandarins governed in principle by the ancient Chinese system of undivided 
state authority, particularly the administrators of lower units were in their 
prelacies in charge of “everything.”12 Nevertheless, there was a certain division 
of public tasks among them: revenue collection, public works, recruitment of 
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soldiers, monitoring of the population, and jurisdiction.13 The latter was a 
main task of mandarins and differed significantly from judicature in contem-
porary European countries like France. 
The entire law was characterized by the fact that the essential elements of 
contemporary European jurisdiction, especially the division between private, 
penal, and public law were non-existent as well as that codes of procedure were 
lacking. The Vietnamese judiciary was dominated by the Confucian principle 
of morality and harmony, court disputes were seen as an expression of the fail-
ure of the peaceful social order, even as immorality. One central attempt was, 
therefore, to engage as few persons as possible in a court hearing, which all in 
all rather resembled an administrative act: There was no litigation, no litigant, 
no lawyers etc. Only few persons were involved even in an important legal 
dispute, the mandarin, the defendant or his deputy, and sometimes witnesses. 
The only guarantee against arbitrary justice was the moral integrity of the 
mandarin judge who had to face severe penalties in case of failures or corrup-
tion.14 In addition, there was no division into public, private and criminal law, 
because the underlying code, the Gia Long, was written exclusively as a moral-
izing criminal code. Some other sources of law were characterized by the same 
idea: the King, a collection of five books on metaphysics, history, ethics and 
literature, the Statutes of the Emperor, in which, inter alia, the administrative 
structures had been established, and finally the Lê Code. It retained some sig-
nificance despite the Codification of Gia Long Code. The latter had been in-
troduced in 1812 by the homonymous Emperor and was basically a copy of the 
penal code of the Chinese Qing Dynasty. Committed to the same legal think-
ing the Gia Long Code defined standards for criminal law (penalties, definition 
of crimes, exceptions for the privileged etc.) as well as other legal regulations 
including management of granaries, commercial law, civil status, sacred posi-
tion of the Emperor, sacrifices, military, and public works. 
Court cases were dealt with at the various stages of mandarins’ hierarchy. It 
consisted of three stages. If a party to the conflict did not want to bow to the 
verdict of the notables, it could petition to a low-ranking mandarin. His deci-
sion was not based necessarily on a court hearing. In the case of a crime or of-
fense mostly local notables who were responsible for law and order at the local 
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level addressed directly to the mandarin. He had full authority over all forms 
of punishment. On the provincial level, there was a sort of Court of Appeal 
chaired by the provincial judge. It was the last resort for cases in which cor-
poral punishment was imposed. The third stage of case-law was the Court of 
Appeal in imperial Hue. It was primarily responsible for severe cases of moral 
failure in which the highest forms of punishment, detention, exile and death 
penalty, had been imposed. In addition, at Hue special courts met for cases, 
which involved high-ranking mandarins, infamous rebels or similarly serious 
cases. Another court dealt with matters which concerned the imperial family. 
For the military, there was a different jurisdiction anyway.15 
The Village Community 
The village community was largely autonomous in imperial Vietnam, and its 
dual autonomy as an administrative and social unit was a result of a long his-
torical process, which is not be reproduced in detail here. Originally the villag-
es were supervised strictly by an imperial mandarin, who was also in charge of 
tax collection. Since the introduction of population and cadastral registers the 
payment of taxes came more and more under the control of the local Council of 
Elders.16 With general revision of the civil register under the Emperor Le 
Thanh Tong, the amount to be paid by the respective village became depend-
ent on the number of taxable inhabitants. Since then villages simply gave low-
er population figures to reduce their tax burden. The revision led consequently 
to a tedious and permanent conflict between the central government and mu-
nicipalities about the real population figures. Since the tax reform by Le 
Huyen Tong (1662–1671) the villages had to apply only a fixed amount that 
was calculated on the basis of the last census.  
This compromise had benefits for both sides; especially for the peasantry in 
the villages. The Council of the Elders now apportioned the lump-sum taxa-
tion for the entire municipality to the male patriarchs. This created a signifi-
cant local autonomy with extensive executive powers. The withdrawal of the 
state on the issue of taxation was only the first step towards a far-reaching self-
government of the municipalities in Vietnam. Finally, it included the inde-
pendent organization of local government and the autonomous mobilization of 
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resources (taxes, fees and charges) for tackling common tasks. Municipalities 
had their own common law system which was partly oral, partly written down, 
and deeply influenced by traditional values and local experiences. Local com-
mon law was based on general ethical and moral principles and on codified 
conventions on administrative, judicial, fiscal, police and other matters.17 
The community was nevertheless not completely autonomous, but inte-
grated into the authoritarian and centralist imperial government which con-
trolled military, justice and religion. In addition, village and imperial state 
were connected by the common, above-described culture of “social harmony”. 
An important task of the village community was therefore to ensure peace and 
order internally and externally. This commandment was so strong that it could 
lead to collective punishment against entire communities in case of subordina-
tion.18 Communities had therefore regulatory functions. They were responsible 
for protecting their members from external enemies, bandits and robbers. In-
ternally they were supervised by a municipal police. The municipality was also 
responsible for fending off magical powers that could either produce harmful 
weather phenomena or bring disorder into the “social harmony” of the village 
community.19 In addition villages were providers of mutual solidarity.20 In 
order to meet the variety of tasks, the village council was also organized by 
function. There were lower dignitaries for archive, finance, public security, 
construction and dissemination of news, higher dignitaries for external con-
tacts, and the interpretation of the imperial edicts.21 A central position was 
occupied by the ly truong (mayor) of the village, but the entire political and 
social structure of it was far from being simply hierarchically organized.22 
The Family 
The third pillar of the Vietnamese society was the family. It was on one hand a 
social interaction system, which was structured by the idea of an “order” that 
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produced family roles and a hierarchy of authority. Secondly, the family was 
based on the absolute nature of the paternal power, which was bound to the 
general authoritarian structure of the society, based on authority and order (Vu 
1977, 110). The family hierarchy was formally determined by Confucian prin-
ciples, the “three chains” of family role relationships, better subordination and 
the corresponding values: between father and son (piety), husband and wife 
(modesty), and older and younger brother (obedience) (Silvestre 1889, 124). 
Added to this was ritualized role behavior that was based on rules of conduct, 
which should guarantee the functioning of the role relationships and make 
them visible.  
This family order was also viewed as a prerequisite for the harmonious soci-
ety. Only those who knew how to perpetuate order in family life were suitable 
for a state office. At the same time the order inside of the family was not a 
private but a public affair. Violations of the fundamental value of filial piety, 
for example, were among the ten most serious crimes and punishable by 
death.23 Here it becomes visible how tightly moral and ethical principles were 
linked to law.24 However, law was only part of a comprehensive strategy to 
enforce morality within the entire society. Especially the educated men had to 
set good examples of right conduct, and the Confucian concept of virtue was 
also spread among the illiterate people by memorized poems and stories. The 
patriarch was held responsible for morality and order in his family, and in 
severe cases of misconduct even three generations of a wrongdoer faced execu-
tion. In order to fulfill this collective commitment, the family was equipped 
with great autonomy and substantial rights. The head of the family was al-
lowed to take all major decisions, including the assets, he even had power over 
the lives of his family members as the kin’s judge. Their main obligation was 
the submission to the paternal authority. Specifically violations of this duty 
were severely punished.  
On the whole, the legislation in Vietnam’s villages, families and in the en-
tire country at the time prior to colonization was not designed to protect the 
rights of the individual; it was primarily a system to ensure harmony in family, 
village and society.25 
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France and the Legal Tradition in Vietnam 
Below we deal first with the question of which elements of Vietnam’s tradi-
tional legal system were preserved or altered by the French. In another section, 
we try to determine which new forms of state power and societal organization 
were introduced through law by the colonial regime. Generally speaking, for 
the majority of the Vietnamese population, farmers in villages and family 
groups, colonial rule only changed their legal status slowly and slightly. In 
that perspective, the French rule was characterized by a legal pluralism not 
uncommon in the European overseas empires until their collapse during or as a 
result of World War II.26 By contrast, the Vietnamese elites were ousted. The 
sacred position of Emperor became increasingly undermined, and the power of 
the mandarins was limited by the French administration, or better the manda-
rins were assimilated into the colonial power structure.  
Village and Family Clan during the Colonial Period 
Model for the persistence of the regulations for the mass of Vietnamese were 
those decisions that had been made already in 1864 for Cochinchina27 and for 
Tonkin after 1890.28 Thus, Annamite civil and commercial law was applied 
continuously during the colonial period, insofar as it concerned the relations of 
the Vietnamese among themselves or with other Asians. The French comments 
specified repeatedly the sources of colonial law for non-Europeans in Indochi-
na, especially the Gia Long Code. In contrast not only the French but all Euro-
peans were subject to France’s law; so were the legal relations between them on 
the one hand and the “indigènes” on the other hand. From this principle, there 
were only few exceptions. The “code civile” for example could also be applied 
to cases which concerned “sujets” when French law as “raison écrite” helped to 
overcome the shortcomings of Annamite, traditional law. This was exercised in 
the case of legal innovations unknown to the traditional law, for example in-
surance contracts.29 
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During the colonial period most regulations of striking importance for “in-
digènes” or “sujets” remained effective which were based on the traditions of 
family and municipality law, or on written law, the Gia Long Code in particu-
lar. These included the ancestral cult, marriage, adoption and inheritance law, 
and the provisions relating to that part of assets which were scheduled to 
maintain the ancestral cult. The enormous authority of the family’s patriarch 
was only touched in so far, as that with a Précis of 1883 the “pouvoirs 
publiques” received a general permission to monitor it.30 Primarily, even the 
provisions on land ownership, land and civil registers were left untouched, but 
beginning in Cochinchina in 1871 records were no longer kept in Chinese 
characters, but in French. A risk for the farmers, however, was the legally un-
clear situation of their land ownership. The cadastral was not performed cor-
rectly to colonization, as mentioned above. Property titles were often based on 
privileges or on claims to the communal land. As French citizens increasingly 
acquired land in the context of “mise en valeur” in what now is Vietnam, this 
led to ambiguity, arbitrary interpretation of law, and to considerable conflicts 
between colonial administrations, French colonists and natives.31 
The most important changes in villages and family clans were of a fiscal na-
ture. These reforms were introduced when Paul Doumer reorganized Indochina 
under the aim to make it finance its colonial status itself.32 France had primari-
ly taken over the Empire’s tax system.33 It was based on a poll tax for male 
adults, taxes on land ownership and an obligation to work-called Corvée. This 
system was, as shown above, inefficient because the registers used for this pur-
pose had not been properly maintained since the 17th century. With the De-
cree of 1/2 June 1897 Doumer introduced a new form of taxation in Tonkin, 
which was transferred a year later to Annam. New civil registers and cadasters 
were its fundament.34 Previously unregistered male adults were taxed by 0.40 
piastres per year, registered by 2.5 per year. Two thirds of the Corvée now 
could be replaced by additional tax payments. Real estate tax was also re-
formed by introducing four types of rice fields and six different land classes. To 
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fight tax fraud, a personal tax card was introduced in 1884 in Cochinchina, 
1897 in Tonkin and 1913 in Annam. All male “sujets“were obliged to carry 
their tax cards permanently hence they also served as identity cards: 
“The individual, in the modern sense of the term, appeared in Indochina in the form of 
a taxpayer.”35 
While one should not overestimate individualization on such a basis for the 
rural population, measures like these joined with other colonial transfor-
mations according to the model of “western” lifestyles, especially in the cities 
of Vietnam. Thus, traditional paternalism was called more and more into ques-
tion at least in urban contexts, though the actual thrust of the modernization 
movement in Vietnam became the anti-colonial liberation struggle.36 
The Disempowerment of Vietnamese Elites 
The colonial rule made great use of the strict paternalism in Vietnam, especial-
ly since the French acted hardly less authoritarian than the traditional ruling 
classes. In recognition of the authoritarian structures only few interventions in 
the traditional law system took place during the colonial period. Added to this 
was the experience that the violation of religious feelings and moral values only 
provoked unnecessary problems (Girault 1922, 488). Therefore, for purposive-
rational reasons, it seemed obvious to utilize the traditional authorities to ad-
minister the colony. The debate was mainly on what forms of traditional dom-
ination colonial rule should primarily rely on, and which of its components 
should be developed further to the benefit of the colonial power. Again the 
starting point was experience in Cochinchina. While replacing the old “man-
darinat” by a group of French and French trained officials, the colonial admin-
istration encountered severe problems. These were to be avoided in Annam and 
Tonkin.  
Since 1874 a treaty between France and the Empire of Vietnam regulated 
the status of both as French protectorates. The treaty text itself, however, did 
not include the term protectorate, but the non-binding “protection“. The court 
in Hue stuck to its narrow interpretation to protect the country’s remaining 
sovereignty (Vu 1977, 139). The French Government, however, had in 1880 
laid the groundwork for a future policy in Vietnam. According to the Frey-
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cinet-plan, the political goal was to subject it to the direct sovereignty of 
France. But France was initially hesitant when it came to an early realization of 
this goal by military intervention. This was less due to the military weakness 
of the government in Hue, but rather to two other factors: Firstly, until 1880 
it was still unclear which value France could gain from colonies in Indochina. 
Secondly, France initially was not interested in a further military confrontation 
with China, which also had significant interests in Vietnam. 
French policies in Indochina became clearer after the outbreak of the Fran-
co-Chinese War, and a following series of rebellions in Vietnam. Harmand 
Convention (1883) and Patenôtre Treaty (1884) established three different 
legal statuses for Cochinchina (direct French possession), Tonkin (control by 
French resident) and Annam (relative independent administration).37 Since the 
Patenôtre Treaty in particular France dealt more carefully with the existing 
institutions, and implemented a strategy which was based on the idea of an 
intermediate-term co-operation with the traditional elites in securing its colo-
nial interests. In the long-term Emperors and mandarins were to be ousted.38 
Colonial rule therefore led to a gradual degradation of imperial authority. 
France firstly reduced it through rigid interpretation of the protectorate’s sta-
tus, in a second step the Emperor was also damaged as a sacred symbol. Provi-
sions of the Gia Long Code about imperial privileges were simply ignored, and 
its sanctions were at least mitigated.39 The French were so successful in de-
stroying the power and sacral function of the emperorthat already in 1920s 
that he served as a nation-wide symbol of collaboration, decay and corruption.  
Since the Patenôtre Treaty the mandarins’ position of power was curtailed 
systematically. In Annam the “Resident général” took over all functions that 
had previously been in the hands of the high mandarins: Secret State, Regency 
and Privy Council. Furthermore, he monitored the content of decrees and 
edicts, and controlled public works, finance, army and the various ministries.40 
The competencies of the “Resident supérieur” in Tonkin were even more ex-
tended because he also supervised common people and mandarins, and created 
his own system of indigenous office-holders. Later, under de Lanessan, France 
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partly revised its strict control over the administration, and re-strengthened 
the position of the traditional mandarins in Tonkin. 
Nevertheless, there was no going back to the old order any more, which 
was secured by a deep transformation of the educational system. Classical Con-
fucian thought had been one of the quintessential fundaments of governance in 
countries like Vietnam, because its acquisition by imperial exams was directly 
linked with a career within the imperial mandarinat. The abolition of the tra-
ditional civil service exam, and its replacement by the governmental French 
“école” therefore formed a deep, not only educational incision, which was com-
pleted in the different parts of Vietnam at a different time. In Cochinchina, 
there had been no examinations since the withdrawal of the imperial manda-
rins in 1868; in Tonkin, the exams were abolished in 1906, and in Annam 
1919. The transition from a Vietnamese-Chinese to a European-French educa-
tion system was carried out slowly and in several stages until the 1930s. Espe-
cially in an initial stage France was primarily interested in teaching the French 
language to a limited number of local experts and translators. Educational 
reform grew in importance when France changed its colonial policies from 
“assimilation” to various forms of “association”. Since then the French influ-
ence in education became even more ambivalent.  
Vietnam under the Nguyen Dynasty had been decisively influenced by the 
model of the Qing dynasty and Chinese culture. Vietnamese was a language 
that was rarely written even in the Nom script. With the Latin letters of 
“Quoc Ngu” the French therefore presented a medium for the dissemination of 
the vernacular language, that was for both, the colonial administration and the 
Vietnamese population, on the one hand of great advantage. The Vietnamese 
language transformed from a spoken language to a written one. French officials 
at least could read written Vietnamese without being forced to learn hundreds 
of Chinese characters. On the other hand the proliferation of “Quoc Ngu” 
posed for the colonial power a serious disadvantage as it hampered the success-
ful dissemination of the colonialists’ language. The educational reform even 
promoted the emergence of a “national culture“, in particular a literature in 
Vietnamese.41 Even though France tried to improve its co-operation with the 
mandarins after 1890,42 in total, the French law of education had adverse ef-
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fects. It produced new academic elite, with European knowledge and equipped 
with a new means of communication, Vietnamese as a written language.  
The Creation of the Colonial State and Its Ambivalences 
The starting point for the creation of the colonial state had been military con-
quest and force, but the latter was transformed more and more by non-military 
regulations until the end of the colonial era. Compared to the mother country a 
different law was effective in the French overseas empire, the so-called colonial 
law.43 All possessions, colonies as well as protectorates, were French territories, 
and under the same French state power as was the motherland. As such, all the 
inhabitants of French overseas territories were French nationals. Legally, how-
ever, there were four classifications which determined their legal status. French 
law distinguished between full citizens, called “citoyens”, “étrangers” from 
other European countries, “indigènes” or “sujets”, indigenous persons from the 
respective colonies, and “étrangers assimilés à l’indigènes”, in Indochina for 
example persons from other Asian countries. “Indigènes” or “sujets” had only 
limited legal rights. Only a “citoyen” was under the Code civile and had there-
fore full citizenship, particularly the “droits politiques”, especially active and 
passive suffrage.44 “Citoyens” took part in the French parliamentary elections, 
even if they resided in the colonies. A “sujet”, however, was a citizen in the 
colonies, for whom not the Code civile but his “statut indigène” was effec-
tive.45 If we consider the continuing validity of the local laws for the Vietnam-
ese, this meant a serious discrimination for them. A “sujet” could ascend by 
four stages to “citoyen”; but this status could it be withdrawn again. Amongst 
other things France tried on the creation of the French Union to reform the 
personal law after the Second World War, but it was too late already, as the 
colonial empire disappeared in the following two decades.46 
Metropolitan France knew four sources of law: the Constitution, laws, de-
crees and orders of the head of state ministers, prefects or mayors, decrees and 
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orders served for implementation of laws, and legislation on the basis of special 
authorization. In the colonies the entire legislation of the mother country was 
in force, if not opposed by other regulations (such as provisions of protectorate 
treaties). Once French authority had been implemented, laws from the mother-
land were only effective in the possessions if they were explicitly introduced by 
decree of the governor. This provided the colonial administration with an 
enormous power over its sujets. The latter was even increased by the peculiari-
ties of French administrative law, which guided the proceedings of the “ad-
ministration publique” in France and in its colonial empire. Even today French 
administrative law has a praetorian character as it is not codified, and is based 
on the jurisprudence of the “Conseil d’État”,47 and complex discussions about 
individual decisions. It is more about enabling the proper functioning of the 
administration in its principal activity of serving the public, rather than the 
control of the administration or even the protection of citizen’s rights.48 Par-
ticularly before World War II French administrative law caused considerable 
legal uncertainty that could be even arbitrary in a colonial context.49 
The Colonial Ministry had precedence in the control of protectorates and 
colonies, and it also maintained a “Conseil coloniale” for advice on draft laws 
and decrees. However, the ministries of justice, home, postal, and foreign af-
fairs possessed important competences too. For the entire colonial administra-
tion there was a General Inspectorate and (in 1920) inspections of Health, 
Public Works and information. The administration in the various French pos-
sessions was headed by a governor, whose field of responsibility was defined in 
the older colonies by a statute. In more recent acquisitionsthe governor was 
directly subordinated to the authority of the Minister of Colonial Affairs. The 
governor had extensive competences, which included the right to legislate, to 
manage the colonial administration, and to supervise jurisdiction. He could 
communicate diplomatically with neighboring countries. In addition, the 
governor had the supreme command of the French troops and the right of in-
spection. In some colonies, there were also colonial entities, such as the adviso-
ry “Conseil privé”, and a “Conseil général”, or a “Délégation financières” if 
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French from the motherland controlled the colonies’ budget through elected or 
corporative assemblies.  
The administrative organization for the control of Indochina was created in 
1887 with the Union Indochinoise. It consisted originally of the colony 
Cochinchina and the protectorates Annam, Tonkin and the Kingdom of the 
Khmer. In 1893 Laos was incorporated, and in 1900, finally, Guangzhouwan 
in southern China. Union Indochinoise was a culturally and economically very 
inhomogeneous political union. However, the full establishment of an Indo-
chinese state was the work of Paul Doumer.50 Doumer reorganized French 
Indochina as a powerful political-administrative structure with a dual function: 
“to integrate all the Indochinese political structures into the French state-
controlled system and to neutralize the former Vietnamese, Khmer, and Lao 
states, as well as the political structures of the montagnards, and to convert 
them into subordinate apparatuses that could be used to control the colonized 
populations.”51  
The political-administrative structures of the Indochinese Union were de-
signed along the lines of British control in India. The concept of association 
replaced assimilation.52 Union Indochinoise was headed by a “Gouverneur 
général” based in Hanoi,53 but in practice, however, the different parts of the 
Union were controlled by various, rather independent sub-administrations – 
the Governor of Cochinchina, and High Residents in Tonkin, Laos, Annam 
and Cambodia. There was a Governor-General but no General-Government. 
Therefore, the colonial rule was not homogeneous, but marked by deep con-
flicts, such as between the Governor of Cochinchina on the one hand and the 
High Resident in Hanoi on the other. There were also conflicts that involved 
the motherland, as between the Indochinese merchants, French industrialists 
and Catholic missionaries. Perhaps precisely because the administration was 
lacking uniformity there was an enormous presence of French officers in Indo-
china, at least if we compare it with the model-giving British India. The num-
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bers of French made the administration of the Union and its parts a costly 
affair.54 
The direct presence of the French in Vietnam contributed to a substantial 
disempowerment of the traditional ruling elites. We should avoid drawing too 
dark a picture of French Colonial rule in Indochina,55 but we cannot overlook 
how limited France’s attempts were until the 1930s to introduce reforms or 
even political participation. Several reasons can be cited. The French colonial 
administration stood from the beginning in the tradition of supposedly insur-
mountable Indochinese authoritarianism. From this point of view to compro-
mise with the subjects was nothing but weakness in the eyes of the colonial-
ized. The rigidity in which France exercised its power in Indochina was also 
caused by the enormous competences of the administration, which was not 
controlled by the colonial “sujets” but from the distant capital Paris, by the 
French parliament, ministries and the press. Their Indochina policy was not 
consistent, but mirrored complex political conflicts and constellations of inter-
ests that were negotiated by parties and business associations. Aside from these 
specific interests all the French who were involved in governing Vietnam were 
influenced by Orientalism: Political left as well as right idealized the Indochi-
nese societies as traditionalist, immobile and dominated by small-scale social 
structures. Accordingly, the real “mission civilisatrice” of the French in Indo-
china was primarily to preserve its valuable traditions and cultural treasures,56 
and only secondly, if even at all, open it up to a cautious modernization.  
The French Police State 
Modernization mainly was limited to changes in the apparatus for surveillance 
and in penal law. France not only kept the significant authoritarian structures 
in Vietnam unchanged, but preserved them by a modernization of Vietnam’s 
police units. A Garde indigène – in Cochinchina Garde civile – was founded 
and given the task to monitor the villages. Especially to combat the growing 
anti-colonial movement or other types of unrest since the outbreak of World 
War I, courthouses, and prisons were built, and police units were created to 
prevent and combat anti-colonial movements and revolts: the Sûreté générale 
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Indochinoise was established in 1917, the Police spéciale de Sûreté in 1922.57 
In both cases the number of personnel was limited, but infamously effective 
due to the fact that colonial police forces in general were above the law. French 
rule in Vietnam was based on violence; brutality and electric torture during 
interrogations were on the agenda particularly since in the 1930s. During 
rebellions, squad teams traversed the riot areas and carried out summary execu-
tions. Because of colonial racism and the lack of an indigenous tradition of the 
prison sentence until 1954, no prison in Indochina served the concept to reha-
bilitate the inmates.58 Under often terrible conditions political and “normal” 
prisoners were detained in provincial jails, penitentiaries and in total 9 penal 
colonies in Vietnam. Per capita, the rate of the prison population in Indochina 
was significantly higher than in France. Political prisoners were also deported 
to French Guyana. Forced labor, which was forbidden by law theoretically, was 
just as common as corporal punishment; mortality among the prisoners was 
high. In particular, the penal colonies were notorious for bloody revolts and 
violent attempts at liberation. 
Political participation by elected provincial or municipal assemblies existed 
only in Cochinchina and in some major cities. Evidently French “citoyens” 
were overrepresented but even the expression of their political will was increas-
ingly restricted by colonial administration after the turn of the century. At 
least the limited political participation of missionaries, officials, planters and 
businessmen could be compensated by a free press. This was not the case for 
the “indigenous” population of Vietnam: The French press law of 1881 only 
applied in Cochinchina and for publications in French. In December 1898 the 
Gouverneur général introduced by decree pre-censorship for publications in 
Vietnamese and Chinese. The censorship of the press was even tightened in the 
protectorates with the Decree of October 1927: Since then the editors of news-
papers had to obtain a license, make a deposit, and to subject their products to 
pre-censorship. Only periodicals in French and issued by a “citoyen” were ex-
empt from these provisions. Finally, the decree of August 30, 1930 abolished 
the obligation for press products both in Vietnamese and French to be censored 
before publication.59 
                                                     
57 Morlat (1990), 71 ff. 
58 Zinoman (2001), 63. 
59 See Huynh Van Tong (1971). 
86 
The character of a French police state becomes more obvious if we take a 
closer look at criminal justice. During the conquest, martial law had been 
applied by the French army in Cochinchina. Thereafter, by the decree of July 
1864, two different systems of penal law were established; “citoyens” and “su-
jets” were treated separately. For the former, the “Code pénale” was intro-
duced, for latter the indigenous criminal code, Gia Long, was reinstated. It 
extended – with a few exceptions when sujets” had to appear before the French 
courts – in principle over all “indigènes” and other Asians in the colony.60 The 
validity of indigenous law was abolished again by the decree of March 16, 
1880. Since then, with few exceptions, the “code pénale” was in effect for 
Cochinchina, and French judges also conducted the proceedings of Annamites’ 
and other Asians’ cases according to it. .But some provisions of the criminal 
law of the Empire of Vietnam remained in force. For this, the Code pénale was 
supplemented by certain provisions and became a penal code particularly for 
Cochinchina. Since the 1880s, the entire organization of jurisdiction in the 
extreme south of Vietnam followed the model of the mother country. It estab-
lished a court of appeal at Saigon and in total seven first-instance criminal 
courts in Cochinchina. While this system suffered from staff shortages, it nev-
ertheless improved jurisdiction for the French “sujets”, since many cases now 
were excluded from the traditional moralism and strict punitive approach of 
the Gia Long code. It also had provisions of criminal procedural law. Only 
since then was a due process guaranteed to all defendants in Cochinchina.61 
The reforms in Cochinchina laid the fundament for a growing influence of 
the French criminal law and penal system in all three parts of Vietnam until 
1954. French laws and prisons became the rule for French or other non-Asians 
in Indochina. This influence was slowly extended over the “sujets” and Asian 
nationals from Cochinchina over Tonkin to Annam. Penitentiaries, prisons, 
and juvenile detention centers under the supervision of the French authorities 
were established, where also for political reasons convicted “indigènes” did 
their time. The traditional penal system in Vietnam had known no prison 
sentences, but only lighter and heavier forms of corporal punishment, forced 
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labor, exile and various forms of capital punishment. Therefore imprisonment 
was an innovation in Vietnam.62 
In Tonkin and Annam a tripartite judicial system had been created by an 
agreement from March 15, 1874. Originally cases in which only Europeans 
were involved were treated by the French High Residents, cases which con-
cerned Europeans and Annamites were processed by common French and An-
namite courts, acts which concerned only Vietnamese, only by the mandarins. 
Since that time, the jurisdiction was extended more and more by the French 
authorities.63 
Labor Law  
Thus, different legal areas show that France not only used law in a repressive 
way to defend its power in Indochina. Sometimes it also tried – but at the 
same time always in its own interest – to eliminate internationally indicted 
grievances. This was the case for labor law which was an important issue in all 
European colonies because it was directly linked with the problem whether a 
possession was profitable for the colonial power or not.64 Theoretically in Vi-
etnam a sufficient indigenous workforce was available for its “mise en val-
eur”.65 The general problem in Indochina was rather that those areas that 
should be developed economically for the benefit of the colonial power were 
not congruent with the traditional economic and settlement areas of the Viet-
namese majority population.66 While Kinh were predominantly farmers and 
lived mainly in the Tonkin Delta and on the coast of Annam, the colonial in-
terests targeted rather the development/exploitation of the highlands of Ton-
kin, Cochinchina, Southern Annam and the southern Mekong Delta. The re-
cruitment of workers in these areas faced mainly three difficulties: the work in 
mines and on plantations meant for the Kinh farmers a significant change. 
They were also linked with their farmland or their place of residence for reli-
gious and economic reasons. Only the locals could operate ancestor worship 
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and had access to a share of the common lands.67 The Kinh population had not 
without reason shunned the highlands and the Mekong Delta as settlement 
areas for centuries, because living there was in fact a substantial health risk. 
However, high morbidity and mortality were explained by the presence of evil 
supernatural causes. In fact, both were alarmingly high on the plantations and 
in the mines.68 
All this meant that by the end of the 19th century only people from the ru-
ral underclasses volunteered to work on plantations and in coal mines. The 
recruitment was carried out by private companies, and for those who signed 
contracts with them significant protection by labor law existed. In order to 
prevent social unrest and problems (and to make taking up work for larger 
masses of Vietnamese more attractive), the colonial power passed two decrees 
in March 1910 and in November 1918. Since then labor contracts had to be 
registered with the authorities, the contract duration was set at maximum 
three years, working, living and conditions for returning home had to be de-
termined by the contract. In theory, the colonial authorities had since that 
time the right to control whether the promised conditions had actually been 
complied with or not.69 However, these tentative steps to regulate labor stood 
in conflict with a massive interest of the colonial power – the smooth operation 
of the plantations in particular. Therefore, in colonial Indochina even labor law 
remained penalized. Since 1899 breaching workers had to expect up to five 
days in prison and fines between 1 and 15 francs. These penalties were even 
increased in 1918. Since then absence from the workplace was punished with 
prison terms of between six days and three months, and fines between 16 and 
20 francs.70 Nevertheless, these measures proved inadequate; they protected 
neither the rights of workers, because the colonial administration did not suc-
ceed in actually enforcing its control rights, nor did it really satisfy the inter-
ests of the employers, as the high absence rate did not decrease significantly.71 
Especially after the First World War a practice of recruiting labor spread 
that hardly could be called voluntary: Employment agencies negotiated direct-
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ly with the village councils. They were even bribed for an opportunity the 
recruitment agencies offered to them: to get rid of unwanted or poor commu-
nity members, and send these “en masse” (Montaigut 1929, 40 ff.) to the plan-
tations, and coal mines. Basically, this kind of “voluntary” recruitment hardly 
differed from forced labor. The option to work in the plantations and mining 
areas remained unattractive. Workers, who had been dismissed from the con-
tracts and returned to their homeland, came back in a worse health condition 
and just as poor as before. When the abuses became increasingly evident, the 
French authorities undertook in 1927 a new attempt to ensure by legal 
measures occupational health and safety. This time, however, specific provi-
sions were taken: “Inspection général du travail” was created, and rules for the 
recruitment of workers and their taxation adopted. Especially “pécule” was 
introduced, a system of compulsory saving by means of “Livret du travail“ to 
which equally employees and employers had to contribute.72 Nevertheless, the 
late 1920s saw such severe collective action that further (unsuccessful) reforms 
were introduced by the colonial authorities in 1929, 1930 and 1932.73 
Summing up these decrees, it cannot be denied that the colonial ad-
ministration’s will existed to remedy the social ills and to abolish the de facto 
forced labor. In the 1930s, however, the differences between what the colonial 
administration was willing and able to realize and an emerging labor move-
ment were already so large that the deficiencies created a powerful strike 
movement. It formed an important part of the anti-colonial resistance.74 
Summary 
It is possible to point out that the main character of France’s colonial rule in 
Vietnam and other parts of Indochina was that of a “rule of law“. Since the 
military subjugation of the Indochinese territories and the separation of mili-
tary and civilian administration, the French apparatus had always tried to base 
its decrees, regulations and thus actions on law from the motherland. This 
rather formal interpretation must not obscure our view of how limited this 
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approach was, however, and how deeply it was linked with the deficiencies of 
the constitutional state in France itself, and with the general lack of political 
participation in the French colonial empire. We also have to take into account 
that the societal order prior to colonization was rather influenced by the con-
cept of Confucian morality and not of Roman law.  
Colonies are states in the making. The colonial power abolished an ancient 
law system, that of the Empire of Vietnam and attempted to replace it by the 
French one. The plan was to implement a political-legal system in Vietnam, 
which should meet the standards defined by France (and its interests). The 
main dispute among the colonialists was how long this process should take, 
and whether it was to be guided by the principles of assimilation or associa-
tion. Anyhow, colonization was connected with a significant transformation of 
law, first and foremost the disempowerment and de-privileging of the ancient 
elites, the imperial family and the mandarins. To a far lesser extent the legal 
traditions of the Vietnamese village were severed. France applied a top-down 
approach to change the society of its possession. All intrusions were blatant 
breaches of law as it was understood in the Confucian interpretation: as a moral 
all-encompassing cosmological order. Vietnam therefore lost more than only a 
couple of legal regulations. By the abolishment of its moral-legal tradition it 
was deprived of its idea of a harmonious society, whatever it may have looked 
like in reality.  
France replaced Confucian morality by a contemporary interpretation of the 
constitutional state, which, as mentioned above, was characterized by severe 
deficits and rather arbitrary. Though French rule in Indochina was liberal 
compared with other colonial regimes (in India for example neither the provi-
sions of habeas corpus nor the freedom of the press were contemporarily se-
cured) it was based primarily on military conquest and strict police control. 
France established a police state, which would not have been possible to such 
an extent in the mother country. Like in most other European colonies in gen-
eral, central provisions of the constitutional state were not guaranteed to the 
majority of Vietnam’s population, not in the present-day interpretation of 
“Rechtsstaat” but even not in the contemporary, rather progressive peculiari-
ties of the French “État légale”. Like other colonies the different parts of Indo-
china therefore were subjected to a hybrid legal framework, which in the view 
of the colonizers compromised with their backwardness. In addition, interven-
tions in the originally existing legal-moral order were based on purpose. Colo-
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nies are not only states in the making but they are colonies, areas where the 
freedom of the individual is not always the most important dictum the state is 
acting on.  
Regarding the overall balance of the French État de droit in Vietnam, it 
was mainly an uncompleted attempt at nation-building following the Europe-
an model, and deeply influenced by French global ambitions of power and 
economic interests. This process changed the Vietnamese society greatly, but 
rather in terms of the destruction of an old order than in establishing a new 
legal order. The Confucian unity of morals, ethics, law and order was delegiti-
mized especially at the top of society. Therefore the legal changes regarding 
the sacred position of the Emperor and the educational reforms were of utmost 
importance as the latter led to the gradual replacement of mandarins by new 
elites, which were westernized. Below this level, a colonial vacuum was creat-
ed; the lower social strata were in theory at the colonial administration’s dispo-
sition, though in practice the real impact of French governance was limited. 
The same was true for the substance of change France actually reached by 1954 
in Indochina. France destroyed more than it created, and the main changes 
occurred in areas which were essential for the colonial regime to maintain its 
control over Vietnam: labor and educational law and criminal justice. 
The outcome of the “État légale” in Vietnam, Indochina, and generally in 
the French overseas empire was modest at best, and deeply influenced by a 
legal pluralism which left written and unwritten law, customs, and moral-legal 
provisions of Vietnamese families and villages generally untouched. But the 
consequences for the development after 1954 must be seriously taken into 
consideration – combined with other central elements of historical develop-
ment of rule of law since 1945, 1954, and 1986. Today Vietnam is confronted 
with the question whether to further develop its constitutional state following 
the European or German model of “Rechtsstaat”. Another option of growing 
importance is the modernization of the Confucian tradition which is intensive-
ly debated on an international level today. Perhaps Vietnam like other South 
East and East Asian countries can reach similar success in further developing 
its rule of law by adopting concepts of moral virtue again.75 
                                                     
75 See Bell/Chaibong (2003); Holz/Wegmann (2005). 
92 
References 
Benda-Beckmann, Franz von (1992): Symbiosis of Indigenous and Western 
Law in Africa and Asia: An Essay on Legal Pluralism. In: Mommsen, Wolf-
gang J./de Moor, J.A. (eds.): European Expansion and Law. The Encounter 
of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Centuries Africa and 
Asia. Oxford. 307–325. 
Bell, Daniel A./Chaibong, Hahm (2003): Confucianism for the Modern World. 
Cambridge. 
Bell, John (2008): Administrative Law. In: Bell, John (et al.): Principles of 
French Law. Oxford. 168–200. 
Betts, Raymond F. (1961): Assimilation and Association in French Colonial 
Theory 1890–1914. New York. 
Brötel, Dieter (1971). Französischer Imperialismus in Vietnam. Die koloniale 
Expansion und die Errichtung des Protektorates Annam-Tongking. Zürich. 
Bureau International du Travail (ed.) (1937): Problème de travail en Indo-
chine. Genève. 
Chanock, Martin (1992): The Law Market: The Legal Encounter in British 
East and Central Africa. In: Mommsen, Wolfgang J./de Moor, J.A. (eds.): 
European Expansion and Law. The Encounter of European and Indigenous 
Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia. Oxford. 279–305. 
Deloustal, M.R. (1908): La justice dans l’ancien Annam: Code des Lê. In: Bul-
letin de l’Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient 8, 177–220. 
Deroche, Alexandre (2004): France coloniale et droit de propriété. Les conces-
sions en Indochine. Paris.  
Doumer, Paul (1905): L’Indo-Chine française (Souvenirs). Paris. 
Durand, Bernard (2015): Introduction historique au droit colonial. Un ordre 
au gré des vents. Paris. 
Eli, Barbara (1967): Paul Doumer in Indochina 1897–1902. Heidelberg. 
Fourniau, Charles (2002): Vietnam. Domination coloniale et résistance natio-
nale 1858–1914. Paris. 
Gantès, G. de (1994): Coloniaux et gouverneurs en Indochine française 1902–
1914. Paris. 
Girault, Arthur (1922): Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale. 
Les Colonies françaises depuis 1815 I. Paris.  
93 
Girault, Arthur (1923): Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale. 
Les Colonies françaises depuis 1815 II. Paris.  
Harmand, Jules (1885): Notes diverses sur quelques questions relatives à 
l’Indochine, Juin–Juillet, Note III: Du protectorat et de l’administration 
directe. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Mémoires et Documents. Asie 
24, 58, 1884–1887.  
Holz, Harald/Wegmann, Konrad (eds.) (2005): Rechtsdenken: Schnittpunkte 
West und Ost. Recht in den gesellschafts- und staatstragenden Institutio-
nen Europas und Chinas. Münster.  
Huard, Pierre/Durand, Maurice (1954): Connaissance du Vietnam. Paris. 
Hübner, Ulrich/Constantinesco, Vlad (1988): Einführung in das französische 
Recht. München.  
Huynh, Van Tong (1971): Histoire de la presse vietnamienne jusqu’en 1930. 
Paris. 
Kley, Bruno (1920): Rechtsprinzipien der Verwaltung überseeischer Herr-
schaftsgebiete nach britischem und französischem Staats- und Kolonial-
recht. Greifswald. 
Lanessan, Jean L. de (1895): La colonisation française en Indochine. Paris. 
Larcher-Goscha, Agathe (2000): La légitimation française en Indochine: 
Mythes et réalités de la collaboration franco-vietnamienne et du réformisme 
colonial (1905–1945). Paris. 
Montaigut, Ferdinand de (1920): La colonisation française dans l’Est de la Co-
chinchine. Paris. 
Morlat, Patrice (1990): La répression coloniale au Vietnam (1908–1940). Paris. 
Nguyen, Anh Tuan (1967): Les forces politiques au Sud-Vietnam depuis les 
accords de Genève 1954. Löwen. 
Nguyen Huu Khang (1946): La commune annamite. Etude historique, juri-
dique et économique. Paris. 
Nguyen Tien Huu (1969): Dörfliche Kulte im traditionellen Vietnam. Mün-
chen. 
Nguyen Van Vinh (1961): Reformes agraires au Vietnam. Löwen. 
Papin, Philippe (2002): Who Has Power in the Village? Political Process and 
Social Reality in Vietnam. In: Bousquet, Gisele/Brocheux, Pierre (eds.): 
Viet Nam Exposé. French Scholarship on Twentieth-Century Vietnamese 
Society. Ann Arbor. 21–60. 
94 
Pham Thi Ngoan (1973): Introduction au Nam-Phong (1917–1934). In: Bul-
letin de la Société des Etudes Indochinoise 2–3, 175–496. 
Phan Thi Dac (1966): Situation de La Personne au Viet-Nam. Paris.  
Ridder, Helmut (2010): Die soziale Ordnung des Grundgesetzes. Leitfaden zu 
den Grundrechten einer demokratischen Verfassung. In: Deiseroth, Dieter 
(ed.): Gesammelte Schriften. Baden-Baden. 7–190.  
Silvestre, Jean (1889): L’empire d’annam et le peuple annamite. Paris. 
Stern, Klaus (1984): Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band I: 
Grundbegriffe und Grundlagen des Staatsrechts, Strukturprinzipien der 
Verfassung. München. 
Urban, Yerri (2010): L’indigène dans le droit colonial français 1865–1955. 
Paris.  
Vu The Quyen (1977): Die vietnamesische Gesellschaft im Wandel. Kolonia-
lismus und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in Vietnam. Köln. 
Weber, Max (1963): Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. 
Tübingen. 
Weidenfeld, Katia (2010): Histoire du droit administratif. Du XIVe siècle à 
nos jours. Paris. 
Wilhelm, Richard (ed.): Li Gi (Das Buch der Sitte). Aus dem Chinesischen 
übertragen und erläutert. Düsseldorf. 
Zinoman, Peter (2001): The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in 
Vietnam, 1862–1940. Berkeley. 
Zippelius, Reinhold (1999): Allgemeine Staatsrechtslehre. Politikwissenschaft. 
München. 
